This article argues that EU external relations since the Maastricht Treaty have constituted the Union as a hybrid international actor, reflecting a number of tensions built into the roots of the treaty. These tensions -reflected in the international roles and status of the EU -arise from the logics expressed in institutions and policies, and the ways in which those logics interact with each other when confronted with situations in which diplomatic, economic and security concerns are entangled. The result is that the EU has an ambiguous relationship to issues of European and world order. Since Maastricht, successive grafts in treaties and other forms have added elements to the EU's external relations, but have not resolved the basic issues and ambiguities attending hybridity. The article explores these issues and ambiguities and relates them to four key roles claimed by the EU in the world arena: those of market actor, security actor, diplomatic actor and normative actor.
Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty (TEU -Treaty on European Union) represents a key juncture in the development of European Union (EU) external relations. It not only introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the institutional architecture of the Union, but also laid the first foundations for what later became the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
Additionally, it introduced to the EU framework a number of policy areas (for example, the 'third pillar' of Justice and Home Affairs and more specific policy areas such as environmental policy) that have come to have major external relations dimensions in the world arena of the early twenty-first century.
The Treaty, though, did more than this. It institutionalised and embedded in the EU framework a hybrid structure of external relations which has fundamentally conditioned all subsequent attempts to establish an integrated EU 'foreign policy', and which is visible in the post-Lisbon era as much as it was in the early 1990s. By 'hybrid' in the context of this article I mean a political, institutional and legal structure derived from heterogeneous sources, or composed of elements of different or incongruous kinds.
2 This structure was not created simply by the TEU -it drew upon and consolidated tendencies that were apparent in some cases from the 1970s onwards -but the Treaty was a crucial formative moment in the process of hybridisation, since it crystallised and cemented in a number of key assumptions and sets of preferences.
These assumptions and preferences were partly political -that is to say, they were rooted in the aims and activities of political actors within the EU context (and more specifically, within the negotiating context for the Treaty itself). As Andrew Moravcsik has argued, the TEU is one of a series of intergovernmental bargains that have incrementally increased the scope and depth of coordination between Member States and European institutions in the field of external relations (Moravcsik 1993 (Moravcsik , 1998 . Others have argued equally powerfully that account needs to be taken of a range of other actors in the negotiating process, and of the effect of institutional engagement itself in generating treaty change for the external relations domain (M.E. Smith 2003) .
Leaving aside the differences of approach and methodology, all would agree that political influences in EU external relations have strong elements of hybridity as defined above, arising from the operation of a 'mixed actor system' and reflecting heterogeneity of political influences. Not surprisingly, this political hybridity was reflected in the TEU's institutional provisions for external relations, and also expressed what might be described as the competing cultures of external relations emanating not just from Member
States but also from the European institutions and from different areas within them.
In terms of the definition given above, it is thus clear that on the one hand the framework set out in the TEU reflected heterogeneous sources, and on the other it consisted of different and what might be seen as 'incongruous' elements. It is also important to be aware that it reflects a number of coexisting logics in the European integration process (M. Smith 2009 ). On the one hand, there is the logic of integration, in which the developing architecture of external relations is a key contribution to the development of the EU itself; in other words, the process through which external activity and presence contributes to the legitimacy and consolidation of the European construction, and is also subject to the progress or the tribulations of integration. At the same time, a different logic takes effect -that of external structure, and the opportunities and constraints that it creates, whereby the evolution of the world arena provides openings or limits for the assertion of a specifically 'European' form of actorness. Finally, it is important to recognise the operation of a third logic, which conditions and is conditioned by the first two -the logic of European identity and the search for a 'certain idea of Europe' in and through external relations, which has been a powerful driver of EU engagement in the world arena.
The two tendencies identified so far -the growth of hybridity and the operation of powerful and intersecting logics in the development of EU external relations -mean that the EU occupies an essentially ambiguous position on key questions of world order. As I have argued elsewhere (M.
Smith 2007), there are important contradictions and tensions in the EU's approach to European order (where it can be seen as possessing formidable structural and ideational power) and the broader world order (where it can be seen as embodying structural and procedural ambiguities that limit its potential and its actual impact). These ambiguities are also apparent in the EU's approach to new centres of power and 'strategic partners' (or rivals) in the changing world arena of the twenty-first century.
Much of the literature produced on the subject of 'European foreign policy' and EU external relations over the past twenty years reflects a series of attempts to wrestle with the coexisting logics shaping EU external policies, the implications of the consequent hybridity and the ambiguities of the EU's role in the world arena (see for example White 2001 , Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 , Hill and Smith 2005 , H. Smith 2002 , K. Smith 2008 , Peterson and Sjursen 1998 , Bretherton and Vogler 2006 , Bickerton 2011a , Youngs 2010 ). This is not the place for a detailed review of this literature, which has come to be one of the most dynamic areas in the study of the EU, but it is important to the argument in this article that no treatment has yet managed entirely to square the circle constituted by these three intersecting forces -the debates continue, and this article is a further attempt to contribute to them. The article itself explores the problem in three stages.
First, it identifies the roots of the problem of hybridity and its embodiment in the TEU. Second, it analyses the ways in which successive grafts onto the root stock of the TEU, mainly but not only in the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, have added to the problem of hybridity and extended it into new areas of external policy, creating what I term a 'third-generation hybrid'. Third, it assesses the implications of the underlying hybridity for the EU's roles in the world arena, and specifically for four types of role: the EU as a market actor, as a security actor, as a diplomatic actor and as a normative actor. The article concludes that the EU has learned to live with hybridity -that it is in fact fundamental to the EU's international existence -but that current conditions in the world arena impose particular strains and pose particular challenges for the EU's hybrid external relations system. (Laffan, O'Donnell and Smith 2000) .
Maastricht: the root stock
The European Community (EC) stood tall in the confusion of the early 1990s
as a stable 'community of law' reflecting the twin assets of democracy and prosperity; not surprisingly, the new or newly liberated states of central and eastern Europe looked upon it as the potential guarantor of these three sought-after qualities -stability, democracy and prosperity -and their view was shared by others such as the United States. It appeared in terms of our earlier discussion that the internal logic of integration through the Single Market and other channels was positive, that the logic of the external opportunity structure was equally positive, and that in a continent where identities were contested and confused, the EC could provide an ideational anchor for those searching for a new European vocation.
The negotiations for the TEU, though, revealed something else.
Although all three of the surrounding logics pointed in a positive direction, this was not enough to dictate a dramatic or transformational outcome for the Treaty (Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992) . The result was, as previously noted, the institutionalisation of hybridity. The Union framework was not a 'tree' but a 'temple', with three apparently distinct pillars under a common roof and a multiplicity of modes of policy-making, many of them retaining a key role for the Member States. In external relations, this was especially apparent;
trade policy was firmly in 'pillar one' and subject to the 'Community method', CFSP in 'pillar two' with an essentially intergovernmental character, JHA (with its major potential resonances for European order) in 'pillar three' with a strong intergovernmental element, and a significant number of major policy areas such as development poised uncomfortably somewhere in between.
The treaty, that is to say, not only institutionalised hybridity, it actually magnified it by increasing the scope of the areas in which it could be found, and by linking this to the development of the fundamental integration project in a new and demanding way.
The implications of this situation were not hard to discern, especially given the key challenges to which the EU was exposed even before the treaty in areas where the Europeans collectively held a substantial amount of institutional and resource power, there were problems to be confronted (Woolcock 1993, Woolcock and Hodges 1996) . The period of negotiation, ratification and implementation of the TEU was one in which the external opportunity structure for the nascent Union was 'open' if confused, but in which issues around the nature and scope of integration in external policy and the nature and limits of a common European consciousness remained unresolved.
As a result of this rather painful germination and rooting process, the strengths and weaknesses of the Maastricht bargain on external relations were being questioned even before the treaty came into operation. Once it was in effect, the debates did not subside, and the problems of collective action, resources and impact that were exposed in the early 1990s formed part of the context for the Reflection Group established in1995. Most significantly, though, in terms of the argument here, there was no suggestion that the treaty should be uprooted or abandoned; rather, the debate was about how it might be refined and strengthened especially in the operational sense. The roots were established -the question was how the hybrid structures that had been set up could be made to work more effectively and coherently.
The Negotiation of Hybridity: from Amsterdam to Lisbon
The decade between the preparations for the Amsterdam Treaty and the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty was a constant if punctuated effort to grapple with the implications of the hybrid external relations structures that had emerged from the early 1990s. It was argued earlier that these structures brought together both well-established areas of external relations and novel domains of external activity, and that the three-pillar structure embodied in the TEU constituted in a very direct sense the institutionalisation of hybridity.
Here, I focus on three sets of efforts to negotiate this set of structures, and on a further set of forces that strongly shaped the context in which these efforts took place.
The By the end of the 1990s, it could thus be argued that substantial progress had been made in extending and integrating key areas of EU external relations. This had been achieved not simply through the negotiation and renegotiation of treaty provisions, which often followed developments in the operational area rather than initiating them. Rather, it had been developed on the basis of successive grafts onto the structure of EU external relations established initially at Maastricht in 1991-92. The structure was still therebut it had had a number of new instruments and attributes grafted onto it, which had changed both the appearance of the structure, and more importantly the dynamics of its operation. By the early part of the twenty-first century, at least part of the 'maximalist' agenda from Amsterdam had been achieved, and more was to follow, by a process of evolution rather than revolution, without disturbing the roots laid down at Maastricht. One of these other roles -and arguably the one with the most marked development during the twenty years since the TEU -is that of the EU as security actor. This is not to argue that the European integration process before Maastricht was not at least indirectly a process with security implications; rather, it is to note as many others have done that it was at Maastricht that security policy became an essential part of the way in which the European integration process was constituted and understood by those This essentially evolutionary approach to the development of the EU as a diplomatic actor was subject to challenge from the outset, but there were powerful forces lined up to defend it. As noted earlier, the pressure to complete the unfinished business of the TEU on such matters as the resources available to the CFSP, the provision of continuity in coordination and the development of a 'European' diplomatic presence made itself felt in the Amsterdam Treaty especially, and led to rapid evolution in the late 1990s.
The establishment of the office of High Representative for the CFSP, and its occupation by Javier Solana, was a major element in raising the profile of this area of diplomatic coordination, and the division of labour between Solana The development of rules and conventions for handling relations between the EEAS and other Brussels services has been a major preoccupation, and has consumed much energy, quite apart from the development of new ways of dealing with Member States, some of whom have high expectations of the EEAS and others of which harbour deep suspicions. This could be seen as a disabling manifestation of hybridity, and of the three logics to which I have drawn attention in this article; but the point needs to be made that in many ways these needs for adjustment and innovation have been faced by all diplomatic services, not just by the Brussels machinery.
The fourth role for the EU in its external relations to be examined here is in some ways different from the others examined so far. Whilst these dealt with (admittedly broad and changing) areas of external activity, the notion of the EU as a normative actor poses distinctive questions. In some ways at least, these questions pervade the other three areas we have explored, because they relate to the EU's self-identification as a 'different' form of power in the world arena. This self-identification has not only been powerful as an influence on policy discourses -it has also attracted a large and growing number of scholars to the field (for example, Manners 2002 , Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007 , Whitman 2011 . It shares with the areas explored above the fact that it became more explicit and more formalised in the Maastricht Treaty, which set out for the first time a set of principles on which EU external action was to be based. These principles embodied multilateralism, This means that rather than a set of clear-cut and distinct roles for the EU in the world arena, we are confronted with a considerable level of role confusion, reflecting at least in part the impact of the three underlying logics of EU external relations. Although in this part of the discussion I have identified four rather broad roles, it is also evident that there can be conflicts, tensions and uncertainties within the four areas: thus for example, there are tensions between the EU's role as 'liberalising' and 'protectionist' market actor, between the 'civilian' and 'martial' tendencies in security policy, between the multilateralist and unilateralist tendencies in diplomacy, and as already noted between the materialist and the ideational in the EU's self-perception as a normative power. This is an international actor -to put it crudely -that at certain key points either forgets or cannot articulate its script, or seems to speak with a forked tongue. Such a tendency is a reflection of the demands of the integration process, the fluctuating challenges and opportunities produced by a rapidly changing external context and the 'thin' self-identification of the EU as a normative actor. Most importantly, for the purposes of the argument here, the tendency is rooted in successive attempts to deal with hybridity in the structures of the EU's external relations, starting with Maastricht.
Conclusion
A number of significant conclusions flow from the arguments presented here.
The first is that the Maastricht 'root stock' has had a potent effect on all subsequent efforts to define and redefine the EU's external relations. This is not to say that all subsequent efforts have been prisoners of the TEU, but it is to say that those efforts have been working within and trying to grapple with a set of political, institutional and cultural constraints that were embedded in and by the Maastricht Treaty.
A second and linked conclusion is that there have been successive grafts onto the Maastricht root stock, and that these have created new dynamics and tensions of their own by constituting the current framework for EU external relations as a 'third-generation hybrid'. As noted earlier, each of the Amsterdam, Nice, Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties has attempted to deal with the effects of embedded hybridity in the EU's external relations, and the two key phases of negotiation and renegotiation have each added to the scope and scale of that hybridity without resolving the essential problems to which it gives rise. Partly this is because the context within which the successive treaties have been negotiated has not transcended the interaction of the three logics that lie at the core of this article. They have had to cope with the fluctuations of the integration logic, the external logic and the identity logic whilst also dealing with the intersections and interactions between them.
And as noted at the outset, the treaties themselves have then fed back into the subsequent operation of these three logics to create a new context for subsequent (re)negotiation of the external relations structures.
A third conclusion is that the Maastricht root stock has proved robust and resilient in the face of radical contextual change. One reason for this is that the successive grafts noted above have contributed to a modification of (although not a reduction of) hybridity. Most notably, the 'three pillars' and the 'temple' structure that served as a compelling image of the Maastricht outcome have been changed: what we see now is like a set of three major tree trunks growing from a common root, in which the branches have become entangled so that in some areas at least it is difficult to distinguish what relates to one trunk and what to another. This is still an essentially hybrid structure, for example when compared to the image of a single tree with different branches that was also canvassed at Maastricht. The three trunks derive from the same roots, were trained to grow in different directions, but have grown together to create a complex and resistant whole, without significantly undermining the hybridity established and made explicit by Maastricht.
What further conclusions can we draw from this for the present and future of the EU's external relations? First, they are robust and vigorous and this is partly because of their hybrid nature. Second, they can be adapted to changing circumstances without losing their essentially hybrid nature, and they thus constitute a stable and persistent pattern of relations despite the fact that they exist in a different world from that of the TEU. Third, it is more profitable to work with the hybridity -to look for means of coordination and coalition-building within the structure -rather than to look for grand transformations into some purer state. The EU's external relations continue to be hard work, and continue to be criticised externally for incoherence and inconsistency, but that is part of their essence, not something to be wished away. In the current state of the integration project, challenged from within by crisis and from without by an increasingly multipolar world, and subject to problems of identity and legitimacy at several levels, it might be reassuring to reflect on the robustness and vigour of the hybrid established twenty years ago.
1 I am grateful for comments and suggestions made by David Allen and Ole Elgström on the draft of this article. 2 This basic dictionary definition of hybridity is adopted for the purposes of the argument here, but it should be noted that there is a significant literature within Comparative Politics on the features and dynamics of hybrid regimes. See for example Diamond (2002) , Brownlee (2009 ), Bogaards (2009 ), Molino (2009 and Levitsky and Way (2010) . More recently, this set of approaches has been extended into consideration of issues such as peace-building: see for example the special issue of Global Governance (18(1), 2012) and particularly the articles by Jarstad and Belloni (2012) and Belloni (2012) ). The comparative politics literature focuses especially on the phenomenon of 'competitive authoritarianism' or 'defective democracy', where elements of democratic rule such as elections co-exist with a wider authoritarian structure; the peace-building literature focuses especially on related issues of 'hybrid peace governance' in political orders where contrary elements coexist and the possibility of violence is high. These approaches also raise the issue of stability -are such regimes or orders in transition, or can they be stable and persist for extended periods? The latter question will be examined with respect to the EU's external relations in the Conclusion to this article, since it is clearly significant to the argument advanced here.
